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1. Introduction: Parameters and Objectives 
Belonging and migration, like nationalism and globalization, might seem to be 
contradictory notions. This article wants, inter alia, to explore if (and how) this is 
indeed so. Whether “belonging” denotes “roots”, “stasis” and “traditionalism” in the 
context of bounded territoriality and national identity, whereas “migration” is linked to 
“mobility” and “postmodernity” in the context of porous borders and the insecurities 
attendant on globalization. Whether both belonging and migratory flows, in their 
global interaction, have acquired new meanings which call for new concepts, new 
ways of conceptualizing and explaining these phenomena. And how questions of 
belonging related to migration and migrants compare on the one hand with the global 
identity of contemporary travellers and cosmopolitans, and on the other different 
representatives of latter-day politics of identity--from above as well as from below. 
 In terms of the ways such issues are pervasively addressed--as “problems” or 
“solutions to problems”--in both public and academic debates, a notable change has 
undoubtedly set in compared with, say, 20 or 30 years ago. The most obvious change 
pertains to the ubiquitousness as well as legitimacy with which the notion of 
“belonging” is now universally applied in discussions about identity, ethnicity, 
nationality, citizenship, migration and multiculturalism--as a matter-of-course feature 
of an identity which is being constantly threatened; as a desirable objective; as an 
argument for minority groups making claims to autonomy or increased recognition; as 
part and parcel of political discourses either for or against multicultural societies; or as 
a notion dismissed by people--multicultural academics as well as global entrepreneurs-
-who perceive it as outdated and oppose ethnic-primordialist positions because humans 
have “feet” rather than “roots”.1 
                                              
1 It is hard not to attach a passing comment to this faddish internationalist way of critiquing 
primordialism: “Trees have roots, humans have feet”. Well, cows have feet too. What they don’t have 
is mind, intelligence and consciousness to conceive of themselves with “roots”, nor do they have their 
very own politicians and opinion-leaders impressing their national rootedness on them, or--if they 
choose to use their “feet” to move elsewhere--a corresponding set of people telling them that they 
don’t belong and should get back to their “roots” as fast as possible. 
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 In other words, whereas belonging used to be a notion almost exclusively used by 
right-wing racists intent on drawing a rigid line between their own national-natural and 
therefore “organic” belonging “here”, and the Other who just as naturally belonged 
“elsewhere” and therefore not here (consequence: closed borders and repatriation), 
today it has developed into a broadly agenda- and debate-setting key concept. It has 
been colonized by all kinds of “ethnic communities” and political factions as a central 
referent of identity and an important factor of “identity negotiation” in a context of 
rapid global change. Today, “belonging” is part of both mainstream discourse and of 
competing, alternative discourses, undoubtedly not in spite but because of this rapidly 
transforming context. In the process, some of the formerly ridiculed rightist positions 
have insidiously been taken over by much larger groups, though their normative status 
have, for the same reason, undergone a climate change. 
 Analytically, “belonging” must be situated in relation to four key parameters which 
in varying configurations are responsible for its relations to and importance for the 
identity politics of different groups. They are, in systematic order, (1) sources of 
belonging, (2) feelings of belonging, (3) ascriptions and constructions of belonging, 
(4) fluidities of belonging. Broadly speaking the site of (1) is “locality” and immediate 
familiarity, of (2) socio-psychological needs, identification with “locality”, and 
memory, of (3) nationalism and racisms, new and old, and of (4) globality and the 
cosmopolitan dream. The four build on and presuppose each other in this sequence. 
For instance, (2) cognitively and affectively orders the wellspring and conditions of 
belonging as categorized under (1) and hence entails an element of “construction”, in 
that feelings of belonging are never totally unmediated or entirely “pure”, but always 
pass through mental processing, personal and collective experiences, and the temporal 
distantiator and psychological filter of “memory”--all of which shape each individual’s 
images and perceptions of belonging, giving them depth and value, and engendering 
the meaning they have for different persons. But, nevertheless, this element of 
constructedness is not socially, “ethnically” or politically “predetermined” and “pre-
structured”, and there is no question of belongingness being the object of identity 
politics, being ascribed in fixed national categories from without, or being a contested 
issue of racist stereotypes or the politics of immigration and integration--like in (3). 
Likewise, the fluidities of global belonging are unimaginable except on the real-life 
background and normative assumptions of national constructions.  
 In addition to this and at this juncture, the following brief comments on each of the 
four sites must suffice. 
 Sources of belonging: Locality and the Familiar. My basic presupposition is that 
belonging is rooted in “place” (rather than space, which is a much more abstract 
notion), “familiarity”, “sensual experience”, “human interaction” and “local 
knowledge”. These elements constitute the sources of “homeness”, its “conditioning 
context”, but they are not equivalent to nor do they automatically produce feelings of 
belonging, let alone “identity”. In other words, belonging is conditioned by social and 
psychological concreteness--persons, landscapes, sensory experiences and “mental 
mappings” of an immediate and familiar kind (often, but not invariably embedded in 
the “formative years” of childhood and adolescence). These are the materials, the 
building blocks of belonging. They are therefore the necessary conditions (but not the 
sufficient reasons) for feelings of belonging, homeness and related “identity 
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producing” processes--as well as for feelings of uprootedness, non-belonging and 
“identity alienation” in cases where these conditioning elements have been spiced by a 
dearth of human interaction, continuous spatial mobility, negative sensual impressions, 
and the like. 
 Feelings of belonging: Identification and memory. Belonging as feeling is rooted in 
a positive identification with all or some of the above conditioning elements and the 
interiorization of them as determinants of homeness, self-identity and socio-
psychological security. Feelings of belonging in this sense and on the level of 
immediacy do not have to be a conscious “factor of identification”; rather, 
belongingness plays itself out in terms of the satisfaction of needs, recognition by a 
specific community, participation in its cultural and social activities, and a shared 
“horizon” of ideas, knowledge, networks and topography. In this sense and at this 
point it is a category of practice rather than theory--it is unreflective, “embedded”. 
This kind of “cultural belonging” does not presuppose the existence of an “Other”, let 
alone a contradictory Other for its existence, viability and maintenance, and can co-
exist with other factual forms of “local” belonging without problems or conflicts--
because it is not/has not yet been politicized by nationalizing processes and interests. 
Hence it is this manifestation of belonging and identity that underlies Herder’s theories 
of the non-exclusive nature of different cultural (“national”) spheres (Herder, 
1967/1774). On the other hand, in the course of individual histories, feelings of 
belonging will routinely begin to disengage themselves from this level of unreflected 
immediacy, as belonging becomes more conscious, as people move away from the 
sources of belonging, as belonging starts to become processed through and coloured 
by memory and by experiences, sensations and ideas encountered in other spheres and 
in different social contexts, and as varying forms of sentimentalism, mediated by 
distances of space and time, intervene between “being” and “belonging” (see next 
section). At this point belonging is losing its innocence--an affective “construction 
process” is underway, but belonging has not been transformed and instrumentalized by 
the nation-state context and does not emerge as a “discursive” category and a political 
identity more or less forcefully ascribed to whole collectivities of people to the 
exclusion of others. 
 Ascriptions/constructions of belonging: Nationalism and racism. In this 
“compartment” belonging is collectively transformed into the modern, nation-state 
dependent form of identity, which collapses individual, cultural and political 
interpretations of identity; institutionalizes belonging in the form of passport, 
citizenship, socialization agencies and official, ethno-national versions of historical 
memory; draws boundaries of sovereignty between “us” and “them” (in the process 
producing exclusivist alterity forms); transforms concrete “place” into abstract 
(imagined) “territoriality”; and reinterprets “familiarity” as “nationality” and 
“strangers” as “aliens”--in other words, imposes homogeneity and ascribes belonging. 
Belonging in these forms is couched in organicist, frequently racist rhetoric, and 
produces arguments and discourses about who authentically belongs and who does 
not. On the other hand they would be impossible if they did not have “sources” and 
“feelings” of a truly authentic nature to build on (it is this fact that lends to 
“primordialist” notions of national identity an air of plausibility). These aspects of 
belonging will be developed in more detail below. 
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Fluidities of belonging: Globalism and cosmopolitanism. Belonging as interpreted 
in the nation-state context--”ethnic”, bounded, homogeneous, organic and unitary--has 
never been more than an ideal “model”, always practically contradicted by messy 
borders, migratory movements, ethnic minorities, dual citizenships and multicultural 
polities. Globalization has multiplied and strengthened such tendencies, both by 
weakening the sovereign, autonomous nation-state and by means of transnational 
processes that create or facilitate porous, “open” borders, multiple forms of identity 
and belonging, or even borderless, “virtual” forms of (non-)belonging. Territoriality is 
becoming “de-territorialized”.2 Identities, conceived as homogeneous, essentialized 
categories, are being contested, inter alia through more massive and qualitatively 
different forms of global migratory patterns. In the process a new ideal of homogeneity 
is seeing the light of day: Belonging to the globe rather than the nation. 
Correspondingly, ideas of a world government, or at least world governance, are being 
floated and enjoy increased popularity, particularly among idealists of peace and 
justice. This is the contemporary cosmopolitan dream. Also these aspects of belonging 
will be addressed in more detail below, particularly the interaction between belonging, 
globalization and migratory processes.3 
 Section 2 will outline different contextual settings and configurations of belonging, 
drawing on all of the four categorial distinctions above. Section 3 will address issues 
related to nation-states as sites of homeness and belonging, philosophical questions of 
normativity, and different “models” of belonging in terms of national identity 
constructions. Section 4 will delve more deeply into forms of belonging in 
globalization--multiple homes, the belongingness of global elites, and the impact of 
globality on “national” belongingness. Section 5 examines different forms of 
“transnational movers” across borders with particular emphasis on transnational 
migration and related permutations of belonging and identity. Finally, section 6 
contains concluding remarks on reasons and conditions for the added prominence and 
legitimacy of identity politics and questions of belonging in the contemporary debating 
climate surrounding issues of migration and globalization, 
2. Contexts and Configurations4 
When we first start to think of it, “belonging” is a concrete, innocent, almost pristine 
notion, closely interwoven with and imbricated in the notion of “home”. In fact, our 
home is where we belong, territorially and culturally, where “our own” community is, 
where our family, friends and acquaintances reside, where we have our roots, and 
where we long to return to when we are elsewhere in the world. In this sense, 
belonging, as already pointed out, is a notion replete with concreteness, sensuality, 
                                              
2 In a sense also “national identity” has an important element of de-territorialization--for more on this 
aspect, see section 5 below. 
3 See e.g. Bell, 1999, Bromley, 2000, Hudson & Réno, 2000, Kymlicka, 2001, Rapport & Dawson, 
1998, Skribis, 2000, as well as the volume I am editing with Mette Hjort (see note 4) for interesting 
analyses of new forms of belonging in the context of nationalism, multiculturalism, migration and 
diaspora. 
4 Sections 2, 3 and 4 constitute revised and expanded versions of my contribution to the Introduction 
to The Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity (forthcoming, University of Minnesota Press), co-
edited with Mette Hjort. 
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organicist meanings and romantic images. It is a foundational, existential, “thick” 
notion. In the ways that it circumscribes feelings of “homeness”, it is also a significant 
determinant of individual “identity”, that elusive but still real psychological state of 
feeling “in sync with” oneself under given external conditions. Most importantly, 
“home” and “belonging”, thus conceived, carry affective rather than cognitive 
meaning; the indicative and simplistic statement above, “home is where we belong”, 
really means “home is where we feel we belong”.  
But what, for instance, if where we feel we belong (our “cultural” or “ethnic” home) 
does not match objective ascriptions of membership (our “political” or “civic” home), 
because “belonging” separates into its two constituent parts: “being” in one place, and 
“longing” for another? This is where the web starts to get tangled, where ostentible 
simplicity is supplanted by complexity, permanence by mutability, clear-cut 
boundaries by fluid images of self and other.5 In one sense, therefore, the above 
amounts to a false start, since at best it delineates the contours of an ideal state of 
affairs, a Herderian dream of many different “homes”, and, congruously, as many 
configurations of “belonging”, existing peacefully and permanently side by side. Let’s 
try again, on a less pacific note. 
“Identity and belonging plainly are potentially divisive”, argues Anthony Giddens 
(1999: 129), because “nationalism can become belligerent”. For though belonging 
does not, eo ipso, belong to nationalism, it is nationalism which in our world has 
appropriated and reconfigured most people’s sense of belonging and identity in ways 
that deeply affect the harmonious portrayal given above. Think of it in the following 
way. People may feel that they belong to a piece of territory, to a community, or to a 
state. Normally they will also have a good idea who else rightfully belongs to this their 
own authentic context, their home, in other words how their primary “in-group”, their 
“Gemeinschaft” (Tönnies, 1957) and their “organic solidarity” (Durkheim, 1965) are 
constituted. But, as routinely, they will know and feel who is not part of this in-group, 
and who for that reason does not belong--not really at least, though some of these 
others may well be tolerated, sometimes even as co-citizens of the same state.  
People, in other words, may find themselves living and breathing in their own 
home, their privileged community space, with people of “their own kind”, in more or 
less pronounced “ethnic purity”. But they may also find themselves elsewhere, in 
voluntary or enforced exile, as part of a so-called minority, being treated miserably, 
decently or possibly even quite well by the ethno-national core (Brubaker, 1996)--in 
which case be-longing more often than not turns into a question of longing-to-be...at 
home. This condition will typically produce images and memories, often quite out of 
touch with contemporary realities, of these their authentic roots (spatially or 
temporally)--and sometimes a matching politics of identity as well (e.g. the 
Rastafarian movement in Britain, Native Americans in North America, Turks in 
Germany, German settlements outside Germany’s borders--Volksdeutsche--, German-
speakers in Northern Italy, Hungarians in Roumania and hosts of other groups in 
Eastern Europe that have suffered displacement, deportation, redrawing of maps, and 
state attempts to blot out identities and memories of belonging). In some cases (though 
                                              
5 Such issues are further addressed in sections 4, 5 and 6 below. 
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increasingly rarely) this mental condition will even engender plans for an eventual 
return to them.  
Yet others may find that even though they are living in the place and the space 
where they prefer to be, their home is less than pure because “others” have taken up 
residence there. These others may, as indicated, be more or less reluctantly recognized, 
or they may be ostracized, marginalized, forcibly assimilated (a feature of Empires), 
locked up, killed off, or “repatriated”--either to where they do, culturally and 
ethnically, belong, at least in the eye of the majority wielding the big stick, or at least 
deported “out of territory”, so that the home, soil and culture of the dominant ethnie 
can again become exclusively theirs (a feature of homogeneous Nationalisms).6  
But if we turn the mirror on this scenario, the view we get is different still: Here 
people are also breathing their own air in their own (national) home, but this home has 
either been inundated by a mass of “others” who are now in majority as well as in 
power, or it is being ruled from a political center which is neither in nor of the relevant 
ethnic group, which will therefore be fighting to reclaim their territory for themselves 
through the creation of their own state.  
Once this condition has been achieved, one way or another (and the roads to 
national homogeneity are many and diverse), people may start to feel so much at home 
that their primary belongingness never really becomes a fully conscious issue, because 
the convergence of ethno-nationality, state territory and “homogeneous” cultural 
practices is now normality and can be taken for granted, providing people with a 
commonsense, consensual context for their activities, dreams and aspirations (Billig, 
1995). In fact, the national context and its identity-shaping power can become so 
“banal”, so inconspicuous, that it may cause people to imagine that it has disappeared, 
that they are cosmopolitan and global rather than national, and that nationalism is only 
alive (but not well) in the Balkans and other foreign hotspots, but not in “our” part of 
the civilized world.  
Finally, people may feel that they have several belongings, several places and 
cultures they belong to and which determine their identity as multiple, nested, 
situational or fluid, whereas others react to the uncertainties of belonging following 
either from nomadic existences in the global village or from the impact of globalizing 
forces on handed-down sites of loyalty by developing new attachments, to belongings 
(in the sense of material possessions), familiar surroundings, close-knit localities, or 
the intimacy of personal relationships. Still others choose to abandon all collective 
solidarity in favour of pursuing individualism or elitism, in whatever guise. 
Thus, the English word “belonging” is a fortuitous compound of “being” and 
“longing”, of existential and romantic-imaginary significations and associations, 
configured in multiple ways by the international system of nationalism as 
                                              
6 It must be emphasized that the distinction employed here between empires and nation-states often is 
easier to deal with analytically than in the real world: Assimilating empires might want to assimilate 
precisely in order to reinvent themselves as nation-states, and ethnic nationalisms often operate in 
conditions that are de facto imperial, dynastic or at least multinational. Assimilation strategies in 
France have been successful, hence France is now recognized as a nation-state. They failed in the 
USSR, which is therefore thought of as an empire, whereas the many new states of the NIS area see 
themselves and are recognized as ethnic, in spite of the fact that almost all of them have retained 
sizeable contingents of other “ethnicities”, notably Russians, who are often less than welcome. See 
Beissinger, 1995, and Motyl, 1999, for pertinent reflections on this problematique. 
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simultaneously a political and a cultural ordering principle. Hence belonging can 
constitute an important element of identity and not just can but does lead to manifold 
forms of identity politics across the political spectrum, not just on the right. As pointed 
out in section 1, this rightist confine of discourse and power has now been invaded by 
a motley gathering of on the one hand top-down discourses of national homogeneity 
and on the other “ethnic” groups who “from below” tirelessly seek recognition of their 
status of rightful belonging (either to an existing or a would-be state: blacks in the 
USA, Maoris in New Zealand, Palestinians in the Middle East, Catholics in Northern 
Ireland); organizations and political parties arguing their right to secede in order to 
reclaim their authentic, sovereign space of belonging and action (Taiwan, Quebec, 
Flanders, Kosovo, East Timor); and states finding or refinding each other in old-new 
configurations of common identity or civilizational collaboration (Germany and EU, 
respectively).  
This is a somewhat different picture of belonging than the utopian one we started 
out with: more confused, more bristly, and much harsher. Indeed, as Giddens argues, 
nationalism can become belligerent, though it does not have to. It is plainly divisive, 
though only potentially so. Like forms of belonging, it is an ambiguous and 
contradictory construction, exclusive and international, hostile and friendly, ethnic and 
civic, conservative and liberal, backward-looking and progressive, all at the same time 
(Hedetoft, 1999). It structures belonging along all these parameters. But so does, to an 
increasing extent, globalization as an independent set of forces in their own right. Let 
us take a closer look at these interlocking, and partly competing determinants of 
belonging and identity--the national and the global. 
3. Home as Nation, Nation as Home 
In a thoughtful article, Judith Lichtenberg discusses the “moral ambiguity of sources 
of identity based on belonging” (Lichtenberg, 1999: 171), because belonging (meaning 
national belonging in this context) is both egalitarian and ascribed (i.e. not based on 
individual choice or accomplishment), and therefore in a certain sense clashes with 
liberal notions of the individual freedom to choose: “there is also something illiberal’ 
in basing membership on something over which people have no control. This is, after 
all, part of the reason we condemn racism and other forms of prejudice and 
discrimination” (ibid.).  
Toward the end of this section of her article, Lichtenberg resolves the ambiguity by 
abandoning all analytical and moral distinctions only to take note of the fact that “for 
most people cultural belonging is very important. It is hard to say a great deal about 
this in analytical (as opposed to poetic or literary) terms, perhaps because it is 
basically so very simple: for most of us, our native culture provides us with a sense of 
being at home in the world. (...) we can recognize the superior virtues of other cultures, 
but still feel the attachment bred of familiarity our own culture affords. The features of 
a culture that produce this sense of familiarity and well-being are its language and 
folkways, its sounds and smells, the innumerable subtle and, in the scheme of things, 
trivial customs and practices and ways of life we grow up with” (ibid.: 173). 
This account no doubt would meet with the approval of many, simply because it 
corresponds well both with commonsense perception and emotionally based 
orientation: we feel we belong to our culture, because it constitutes a home of natural 
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embeddedness and unthinking attachment--”familiarity” tout court. Somehow it is 
beyond the grasp of analytical understanding, defies rationality, and has to be accepted 
for what it is. There is something alluringly attractive about this reference to the 
“banality” of belonging, and it does have its merits.  
1. For one thing it takes us beyond the most barren forms of dedication to the idea 
of a constitutional, totally rational form of patriotism and belonging (see Keitner, 
1999, and Yack, 1999, for critiques of this notion). This is an idea which often 
overlooks the fact that national attachment and identity, in whatever form, are 
inconceivable and inexplicable without recourse to a certain measure of irrationality, 
emotionality, sentiment and unselfish dedication. All the apparently rational principles 
of government, citizens’ rights and collective solidarity that are routinely invoked in 
discussions about civic nation(alism)s “tend to say much more about the way in which 
we should order lives within given national communities than about why the 
boundaries of these communities should take one shape rather than another” (Yack, 
1999: 111, emphasis in original). National boundaries have never been drawn 
according to principles of rational argument or moral distinctions.  
In one way, Lichtenberg’s “moral dilemma” points us beyond such categorial 
confusion, by referring us back to the unreflected, emotive sources of belonging. 
However, in a different way it also retains it--as a higher form of “guilty conscience”. 
For what kind of “belonging” is characterized by the normative paradox of a moral 
dilemma? Only that which on the one hand insists on all the concreteness and 
immediacy of familiar surroundings (see comments on “sources” and “feelings” in 
section 1) while transforming them into “national culture”, but on the other, in 
comparison with the supposed rationality of “civic identity”, is reminded of its “non-
liberal”, ethnic and potentially “racist” nature.  
The result is a dilemma of conscience where “feeling” and “reflection”, concretion 
and abstraction, personal predilection and civic responsibility cross swords. 
Lichtenberg interprets sources and feelings of belonging within the ambiguous 
(attractive yet scary) context of the National, on the background of (a) the shady 
history of “ethnic” nationalism and (b) the lures of “liberal” nationalism as well as 
cosmopolitan ideals; hence belonging becomes a moral question of far-reaching 
philosophical import. The suspicion that this might be a reflection not of a more 
general problem but of a particular political philosopher’s pangs of conscience is 
worth considering, but should be tempered by the likely possibility that Lichtenberg 
only articulates, in a specific idiom, that belonging (like national identity) is losing its 
“ethnic innocence” and is becoming pervasively invaded by normative concerns of a 
“liberal” and “heterogeneic” nature--because it has become subjected to widespread 
public scrutiny and been cast in doubt by the “relativization” of nationalism and the 
participatory ideals of deliberative democracy characteristic of the latter part of the 
20th century. As Seyla Benhabib has phrased the question: “While democracy is a 
form of life which rests upon active consent and participation, citizenship is distributed 
according to passive criteria of belonging, like birth upon a piece of land and 
socialization in that country or ethnic belonging to a people” (in Hedetoft & Hjort, 
forthcoming). 7 
                                              
7 This might be less of a contradiction that it appears to be. Citizens are expected to give active 
consent, but on the basis and in the framework of the political, cultural and territorial boundaries set to 
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2. In terms of popular identities, this distribution criterion (birthplace, ethnicity, the 
destiny of “blood”) is pervasively accepted and adopted by national citizens across the 
globe. In this sense, Lichtenberg rightly identifies the unconscious and very powerful 
nature of (national) belonging and some of the immediate objects of reference and 
justification most of us use when asked to explain our sense of “home(sick)ness”. In 
other words, in anthropological terms Lichtenberg’s account faithfully reflects the 
“organicist”, “pre-political” dimension of feelings of belonging to a national 
“Gemeinschaft”. This dimension primarily springs from the fact the nation-state at the 
level of particularity bounds and organizes concrete places, local sites, urban 
architectures, regional landscapes and concretely rooted knowledges and memories of 
locales, as well as familiarities and engagements with these locales and the people 
inhabiting them (see Carter, Donald and Squires, 1993; Czaplicka & Ruble, 
forthcoming; and Czaplicka, this volume). “National space” and “territoriality”, in 
other words, are constructions that rest on what Czaplicka & Ruble call the 
“archaeology of the local”, including a sense of common history, common 
topographies, common genealogy. “Space” is the reinvention of “place” in the context 
of the National. All of this is “instrumental to identity constitution” (my emphasis). On 
the other hand, they do not in themselves, and certainly not in the context of latter-day 
nationalism, constitute identity and belonging at the level of immediacy. Rather, 
nation-states are political contexts that absorb and reorganize--through “mechanisms” 
of construction, ascription, generalization, socialization--these sources and feelings of 
belonging and homeness into the “imagined communities” of “national cultures”. 
Lichtenberg’s account of the “moral dilemma” overlooks or at least seriously 
downplays this process. Rather it tends to reify “culture” by assuming a direct, 
uncomplicated link between this concept and “nation”. The “national” element of 
culture is elided, the implicit argument being the following: cultures (as homogeneous 
units) produce nations which in turn engender strong feelings of attachment and 
belonging on account of the cultural homogeneity underpinning them. Culture equals 
nation equals home equals identity.8 Thus cultures become “native” cultures, taken-
for-granted and matter-of-course frames of reference and action. No matter how 
seductive the argument, then, it overlooks the fact that to the extent we can reasonably 
talk about cultural homogeneities in national terms (and often this is very difficult), 
such homogeneity is the outcome rather than the cause of both historical processes and 
mental reconstructions; of oblivion as much as memory; of elite efforts to nationalize 
the masses in the transition from different kinds of Empire to an international order 
based on nation-states; of selective perception in the process (which all individuals 
must go through) of forming a homogeneous image of their national communities (in 
spite of the fact that most nations are culturally and ethnically “mongrel”, as Giddens 
(1999: 131) calls them) and creating mental boundaries that match the borders of the 
state in which they live--here the national education systems play an invaluable role.  
                                                                                                                                             
and by the national polity. In other words, democracy, though universal at the level of ideals, is 
bounded at the level of actual practice. Or in other words: there are limits to how active, in what 
spheres and in what ways citizens are encouraged and expected to be active. The dilemma, if there is 
one, consists in an increasing awareness, among citizens as well as academics, that “rights” can be 
interpreted in a transnational as well as a national sense. 
8 For a thorough critique of this proposition of homogeneity, see Hedetoft, 1995, Part I, Chapter V. 
AMID Working Paper Series 10
In other words, this kind of explanation overlooks national belonging both in the 
form of Renan’s “daily plebiscite” (Renan, 1882) and of the symbolic and historical 
construction of roots (“native culture”) as identical with the limits of the national--in 
imperative, top-down, discursive terms and as popular transformations of such official 
discourse into second-order naturalness and axiomatic referentiality. In such terms, 
national belonging follows from neither nature nor culture in any simple forms--
though this is how it is often experienced and more often articulated--but is the result 
of complex social and historical processes whereby the political, sovereign 
communities that we know as nation-states reinvent themselves as pre-political, 
simplistic and “ethnic”, partly in the mirror of selective histories of glory, heroism and 
destiny, partly by drawing on anthropological paradigms of kinship, blood and 
territorial rootedness.  
In these communities, therefore, it requires more than just legal citizenship really to 
belong and therefore to be a true native with a genuine and universally recognized 
nationality.9 Features and images of the political (civic) and the pre-political (ethnic) 
community must merge for a nation-state to be experienced and recognized as the 
authentic, cultural home of any individual living inside or outside its politically given 
borders. In other words, the state must appear as nation and the nation as ethno-
culturally given and historically continuous. Identity and belonging must seem to 
derive organically from such pre-politically given homogeneity, though in the real 
world there is no such transparent, innocent and immediate relationship, and whatever 
cultural-national homogeneity there is, more often than not is the outcome of decades, 
sometimes centuries of cultural honing, ethnic mixing and social assimilation or 
exclusion.  
One problem, of course, is that in spite of such long-standing efforts, frequently 
homogeneity amounts to little more than official discourse, a thin veneer of a common 
identity covering up the co-existence of a multiplicity of cultures and, sometimes, 
identities too (take, for instance, the cases of Belgium, the United Kingdom and 
Switzerland as different types of illustration of such scenarios). In this sense, most 
territorial states are not proper nation-states, but “multi-ethnic” in one way or another. 
Citizenship, culture and identity tend to part ways and to reassemble in new and 
multiple configurations of belonging. In the case of the United States, it has now even 
become the quasi-official credo to celebrate Americanness as multicultural and the 
USA as the prototype of an immigrant nation with ethnic roots all over the world and 
little common history to show for itself--a fact which for some bodes ill for the 
cohesion of the USA (e.g. Schlesinger, 1992), but for others signals the strength of this 
(post)modern identity formation, which has managed to create unity out of diversity or 
where homogeneity is simply configured in ways that are different from what we have 
become wont to expect based on the European model of cultural exclusivism and 
ethnic cleansing (Hall and Lindholm, 1999). 
                                              
9 This distinction between citizenship and nationality is one that not least coloured “immigrants” in old 
colonial states like Britain and France have been confronted with, e.g. in the forms of Powellism and 
LePenism. It was Enoch Powell, for instance, who in the 60s talked about the “legal fiction of British 
citizenship” as regards these people and further claimed that “you do not become British by being born 
in Britain”. This is the credo that has since defined the ideologies of rightist nationalist movements in 
most European countries.  
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Whichever take one prefers, the USA for many embodies the liberal, civic nation-
state in almost pure form and reintroduces the question of how identity and belonging 
are structured in plural states that seem to defy the logic of ethnic uniformity as the 
basis for societal cohesion and loyalty. Membership in a republican order with clear 
constitutional principles will not do (cf. the above discussion), since it does not explain 
the emotional attachment and overt manifestations of sacrifice and sentiment that 
clearly characterize the patriotism of US citizens--nor does it account for the 
multiplicity of ethnic groups who, whatever their distinctiveness, all conduct a politics 
of recognition as Americans (and not, say, as humans or cosmopolitans). In fact, as 
Hall & Lindholm rightly argue (1999: 3), no other state makes such a claim to 
“exceptionalism” and “manifest destiny” as the USA, and feelings of belonging to this 
country and its history and myths of independence and conquest are obviously no less 
forceful and deep-seated than in other national contexts. The “home of the brave” 
presents itself to the American imagination (though this comes in infinite sub-
varieties) as basically one, not many, and this oneness is not primarily political or 
civic, though many of the ingredients thrown into the cauldron are undoubtedly of a 
deliberative, rational origin.  
In spite of the fact, therefore, that on the face of it the USA seems to diverge 
radically from the ethnic, European blueprint of nation-states, the fact of the matter is 
rather that the US has reworked and modernized the model in order to assimilate 
patriotic identity (homogeneity) to individualism and cultural pluralism, allowing 
different groups to seek out their own avenue toward American identity, 
exceptionalism and pride, and thus to reconfigure forms of belonging as national, 
subnational and cosmopolitan at the same time.  
Where in Europe political communities pose as pre-political and ethnic, in the USA 
the situation is reversed: feelings of common ethnicity and organic solidarity, shaped 
no less arduously than in the rest of the world and drawing on a wealth of myths (of 
the West, of nature, of frontiers, of the self-made man, of golden opportunities, of war 
and heroism...), consistently pose as political or civic, ethnicity eo ipso being 
universally recognized and officially celebrated only in its plural form and as 
“hyphenated” Americanness. But as Yack succinctly argues, “were Americans (...) to 
make citizenship contingent upon commitment to political principles instead of the 
mere accident of birth (to citizen parents or on American territory), they might become 
considerably more suspicious of their fellow citizens’ declarations of political loyalty. 
Birthright citizenship can promote toleration precisely by removing the question of 
communal membership from the realm of choice and contention about political 
principles” (1999: 116). In other words, an American “nation-state” genuinely based 
on civic, political principles would not be particularly tolerant or all-inclusive, but 
would draw borderlines between “us” and “them” based on formulated, “rational” 
distinctions and assimilate non-nationals in different ways than through oaths of 
allegiance to the flag. 
The result, therefore, is much the same in the two kinds of nation-states: home as 
belonging to nation is a structured set of emotions and attitudes, shaped by an 
imagined oneness of political and pre-political, contemporary and historical, rational 
and cosmological orientations. And at least at the level of “ideal blueprint” (though far 
from always the actual state of affairs), this would seem to hold true for states in other 
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regions of the world as well, in spite of the fact that the roads to the modernity of 
nationalism have been radically different (as have the results) in, say, Africa, Latin 
America, the Middle East and East Asia, where historical interactions of local history, 
impacts of colonization, independence, absorption/repulsion of western cultures and 
ideas, and global processes have resulted in a multitude of particularistic permutations 
of identity, nationalism and belonging. Conversely, what ties them all together, 
whether in a democratic format or not, is the idea(l) of the National as an imagined 
oneness of state and nation, of “civic” and “ethnic”, of past and present, of reason and 
affect. For instance, the PRC’s “one China policies” only make sense in this 
framework of national sovereignty, territorial integrity and historical legitimacy 
(which is also the universally acknowledged passport to recognition as a creditable 
entity by the international community). Liberal nationalism and inter-nationalism, 
however open-minded, do not basically alter these facts (see the next section for 
further reflections on this), and even western-based cosmopolitans--in spite of their 
assumption of belonging everywhere and nowhere in particular--arguably base their 
global outlook and interventionism on the confidence of embeddedness in particular 
national contexts and the possession of a national passport and national citizenship 
rights (Ignatieff, 1993 and 1999). However, what has tended to alter at least the 
conditions for national homogeneity--by imposing new parameters for “homeness” 
and belonging--are European and globalizing processes and the new types of identity 
formation, patterns of international migration, and ethnic politics that have followed in 
their wake. 
4. Belonging in/to Globalization: One Home or Many? 
“Globality”--for want of a better term--spells significant changes in the cultural 
landscapes of belonging, not because it supplants the nation-state and the forms of 
homeness outlined so far, but because it changes the contexts (politically, culturally 
and geographically) for them, situates national identity and belonging differently, and 
superimposes itself on “nationality” as a novel frame of reference, values and 
consciousness, primarily for the globalized elites, but increasingly for “ordinary 
citizens” as well. In this context, notions of liberal and civic nationalism assume new 
implications. Their real news value lies less in the theoretical assumptions as such--
which have been known and debated since the 19th century--and more in the 
widespread interest they have recently attracted, inside as well as outside academic 
circles.  
The pervasiveness of this interest reflects two points worth noting: first, that the 
organicism and essentialism of national identities are no longer just taken for granted, 
but are being universally challenged by forces (whether “rational” or not) claiming 
forms of loyalty and allegiance that are not readily assimilable to the nation-state 
context; and secondly, that this state of affairs has given rise to attempts to rescue the 
nation-state--as “civic”, “liberal”, “cosmopolitan” or whatever--by rethinking its basic 
parameters and proposing a rational trajectory (e.g. in the form of Habermas’ 
“constitutional patriotism” or sometimes even a political program, as in the case of the 
European Union) for its practical transformation, a “third way” between rampant 
globalization and conservative nationalism. 
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This double scenario reconfigures belonging by introducing wedges of uncertainty 
and impermanence into the imagined oneness of political and prepolitical orientations 
that underpins national identity. On the one hand, globality only constitutes 
“belonging” in the most flimsy and liminal of senses; on the other, nationality 
increasingly appears to be no longer a sufficient, though maybe still a necessary 
linchpin of belonging understood as “identity”. This state of affairs, often compounded 
by new forms of individualism and migration, leads to cognitive and discursive 
reactions of different kinds: uprootedness, homesickness, affective alienation, attempts 
to retrace “local knowledges” and circles of immediate familiarity, or the construction 
of multiple homes and hybrid senses of belonging (in other words, new 
cosmopolitanisms or the advocacy of multicultural polity regimes)--though it might 
also imply reaffirmations of old-style nationalism in nostalgic, secessionist or “new 
racist” forms. In all events, it strengthens and reinvents the politics of identity as an 
increasingly transnational phenomenon, in the double sense of finding its way into all 
national contexts as a fairly uniform occurrence, and playing itself out as a 
substantively transnational politics of organization, platform, support and discourse: a 
“McDonaldization” of cultural and political differences, one might call it, exacerbated 
by declining trust in national politicians on a global scale.  
Thus, the logical oxymoron of “civic nationalism”10 and its pervasive popularity is a 
fairly precise reflection of a state of affairs where the nature and context of nationalism 
is being transformed by globalization. Where the age of nationalism and the nation-
state demanded that the political and the pre-political community, citizenship and 
ethnicity/identity, be imagined as one, the “global era” threatens to disaggregate the 
two, either by propagating a wholly rational kind of nationalism as the ideal end-goal 
while relegating ethnic nationalism to the dustheap of a belligerent history (or to less 
civilized parts of the world!); by transposing the “political” dimension of identity and 
loyalty to a supranational level (e.g. the EU, or some ideal cosmopolitan set-up) while 
conceding that people’s ethnicity (or cultural identity) may remain nationally bound; 
or by building “civic” allegiances to the country one happens to live in while 
remaining “ethnically” tied to one’s country of origin (the case of many Turks--or their 
descendants--resident in Germany, for instance).  
Although examples of such cleavages have been around for many years, the 
difference today is that where they used to be exceptions, they are now more like the 
rule: all-pervasive, institutionally organized, and the subject of public and private 
debates. It is becoming widely acknowledged that “hybrid identities”, several homes 
and multiple attachments are a ubiquitous fact of life in most nation-states. Where dual 
or multiple citizenship used to be seen as a remote and esoteric concern, relevant only 
to highly privileged elites, such issues are now widely debated (though not always 
condoned) in contexts pervasively described as multicultural. A cosmopolitan or a 
global citizen today is not to be recognized by the lack of passports (as was the case in 
the 19th century), but far more by the number of passports they can legitimately show 
for themselves--though in practice, the norm is still closer to 1 than one might expect.  
                                              
10 The oxymoronic nature of the concept is nicely captured by Bernard Yack who argues that “the idea 
of the civic nation defends the Enlightenment’s liberal legacy by employing the very concept--that of 
the political community by voluntary association--whose plausibility has been undermined by the 
success of nationalism” (1999: 115). 
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From being conceived as a fact of nature, “belonging” has come to be treated as a 
property of the rational mind, as a particular kind of “politics”, situating subjects 
between individual freedom, collective rights and negotiated identities, and 
confronting states with difficult choices between transnationalized policies and 
communicative strategies aimed at convincing their national populations of their 
primary belonging in and loyalty to their particular nation-state. Increased mobility 
and virtual universes have added to this moveable feast of symbolically and 
deliberately constructing our roots as we go along. Take the following statement from 
a Pole living in the USA as an interesting case in point:  
“Contrary to what you may have thought, we will stay put for the holidays because 
we will have to move out of our current apartment at the end of the month. We are 
experiencing the real thing’--American mobility; every four months at a different 
address! I got so mad that I arranged for a PO Box to get all my mail there. A simple 
PO Box will give me some roots in this soil and will keep me sane--or so I hope. 
Although I do recognize certain Americanisms in me, I refuse to be integrated into this 
culture. During my college years, I had zero American friends. My attitude hasn’t 
changed much since. I’ve just had to be stronger in alienating myself from Americans 
because there were so many of them around, and not enough foreigners. Have I 
succeeded? I don’t know, but I must leave the US in 2000 at the latest. By then, it will 
have been a decade for me, and that is definitely enough.” 11 
This brief excerpt from a much longer set of reflections on the tribulations of feeling 
Polish while being in the USA is a telling illustration of the changes modern 
individuals experience as far as their self-image, identity and sense of belonging are 
concerned, and the affective as well as cognitive processes these changes activate as 
regards re-configuring existential components such as roots, community and stability 
in a global age which this person clearly identifies as “American”. In this setting, 
“roots” shrinks into an unimaginable fixed point, a PO Box address, identity being 
sought in a rationally pursued and implemented outsider existence (hankering for 
many more “foreigners”), and security residing in images of future mobility, across 
state borders, back to (hopefully) authentic roots and a (wistfully imagined) genuine 
ethnic community--in order to escape the consequences of the mobility which life in 
America currently imposes. 
For such reasons, the state of voluntary exilation from one’s imagined roots--and its 
attendant forms of consciousness--is one of the precise emblems of the reactive 
patterns that modern national cosmopolitans resort to in order to cope with (as well as 
rationalize) their existence in societies which apparently offer them ever diminishing 
possibilities for collectivity, adaptation, tradition and belonging of a more stable 
“national” kind. Benedict Anderson’s “imagined political communities” are facing 
significant difficulties when the world for substantial numbers of people appears as 
insecure, fragmented, and lacking in culturally demarcated borders and commonly 
accepted values. The reverse side of exile and marginalization--for the individual in 
the American “melting-pot” or the small-nation collectivity in the European 
integration process--then frequently reappears as a longing for authentic values and a 
                                              
11 This statement derives from a letter to one of the authors from a Polish-American acquaintance. 
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journey back (or forward) to a country, a culture and a citizenship which is less hybrid, 
where politicians are trustworthy, and the language sounds right. 
 Other reactions are possible and pervasive too: the pursuit of constitutional 
patriotism, the development of civilizational identities, the forging of security 
communities, joining inter- and transnational organizations, and the cultivation of 
cosmopolitan stances (including the championing of a global human-rights regime) 
being just a few of them. However, as indicated, globality--or for that matter, 
Europeanness--is not an emotionally convincing substitute for nationality, no matter 
how intellectually and morally appealing such wider identifications might be (Weiler, 
1997). “Belonging” requires, as far as identity goes (rather than vaguer and more non-
committal attachments), territorial and historical fixity, cultural concreteness and 
ethnic exceptionalism, in addition to the existence (at least potentially) of a political 
superstructure with which one can identify and which is the provenance and safeguard 
of passport, citizenship and a sense of communal solidarity. “The globe” does not 
qualify in those respects, not even for the most liberal-minded elites--at least not yet. 
People can develop a sense of multiple homes (often functionally differentiated and 
spatially wide apart). The most affluent elites can even afford to set up house in 
different parts of the world and can use this as a substitute for genuine “global 
belonging”. In their discourse and consciousness such conditions might well figure as 
such a truly postnational situation, materially and identity-wise.  
Nevertheless, these cases highlight the significance of observing a basic distinction 
inherent in the concept of “belonging”, i.e. that there is a world of difference between 
imagining that “the globe”, like material possessions, memories and ideas, belongs to 
“us” (or rather, “me”)--and that “we” belong to “the globe” and “globality”. The 
images of home that we all carry around as regards national identity, and our linguistic 
way of speaking to them, are in the latter category. The question there is: What 
national entity do “we” belong “to”? In our perceptions and conceptions of this type of 
homeness, we routinely objectify ourselves, make ourselves into a part and a property 
of a given nation-state. We somehow adhere to it, are organically bound up with it, and 
spring from it, by virtue of birth, blood, race, history, culture or customs. In this sense, 
Lichtenberg’s “empathetic” argument hits the nail on the head. 
This is all very different in the case of images and discourses of “global belonging”. 
Here the world appears as a terrain of opportunities, mobility, networking, money-
making and so forth: it turns into a means for the achievement of particular goals, and 
does not appear as the end-goal of ideal belonging and identity-formation, as “roots”. 
Potentially, the world is ours, it does not own us. It opens up possibilities but does not 
require sacrifices that we abide by because we belong to it. Or it allows us to cultivate 
myths and reveries of having our real roots elsewhere than where we happen to be, or 
of eventually finding real happiness somewhere else.  
In such terms, “the globe” is a material and utopian tax haven, a site of (imagined) 
benefits, but very little belonging, in the sense this concept has been developed so far. 
Only in the cases of ardent universal religiosity, global environmentalism or the 
idealism of helping needy people on a global scale can we identify traces of an 
ideology of belonging to the globe, based in programmatic ideas of global 
responsibility; but even here the point of departure, more often than not, is a firm 
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rootedness in a specific national identity, and the global position, including its 
cosmopolitan virtues, is ideologically rather than existentially defined.12 
Thus, globalization--while certainly making inroads on the contexts and natural 
assumptions of national rootedness and homeness--does not offer a global substitute 
for them, despite much discourse to the contrary. The forms and perceptions of 
belonging that it engenders are, if not incompatible with those of the National, then at 
best their extension and complement. The new awareness of the difference between 
political and pre-political components of national identity that globalization and 
Europeanization have spawned has led to new configurations for the most globally 
minded, for whom nationality has come to represent their prepolitical, ethnic, “banal” 
site of belonging whereas globality or Europeanness have taken over as the main locus 
of their political orientations and identifications.13 For the rest, belonging in globality 
is either a curse (globality as poverty, a threat to settled ways of life, rootlessness), a 
moderate blessing (globality as a means of getting help and support against repression) 
or an opportunity (globality as freedom and progress: the new land of opportunities); 
but in none of these cases is globality imagined as something people belong to. 
Though “our home”, understood as belonging to a specific nation-state, may be open 
to the globe (liberal, tolerant, sensitive, multicultural), the globe is not our home. The 
“semiotics of belonging” spells different assumptions and implications in the two 
settings and the ever more crucial permutations that the interaction between them 
engenders. 
5. Migrants, Travellers and Cosmopolitans: Fixity or Flux? 
A consequence of these reflections is that we need to re-evaluate the kind of impact 
that globalization has on images and discourses of homeness and belonging in the 
context of transnational migration patterns. Where much sociological and 
anthropological reasoning, informed by postnational theorems, has recently tended to 
hypothesize that the fixity and homogeneity normally associated with national forms 
of belonging are being supplanted by flux, multiculturalism and indeterminate 
spatiality (identity becoming increasingly de-territorialized and “home” being found in 
movement per se) (e.g. Rapport & Dawson, 1988), the argumentative gist of this paper 
calls for caution based on discrete analytical distinctions.  
First distinction: between migrancy and global movement.14This may seem odd, 
since obviously migrancy always involves movement, and often of a 
                                              
12 See Gubert, 1999, for noteworthy contributions to the discussion of territorial belonging in the 
context of culture and ecological concerns. 
13 For an interesting example of such interactions between matter-of-course national identity and self-
proclaimed cosmopolitanism, see Michael Billig’s analysis of the American nature of Richard Rorty’s 
political philosophy, in Billig, 1995, chapter 7. 
14 The distinction used in the following between “migrants” and “cosmopolitans” is at this point 
analytically heuristic. Certain borderline cases do exist, particularly regarding certain types of 
entrepreneurial migrant workers who are adept at taking advantage of the opportunities presented by 
“fluid borders”. This fact does not affect my main points, however, i.e. (1) that the binary distinction 
between architects and victims of globalization is cognitively necessary and normatively justified, and 
(2) that the majority of migrants, especially refugees and persons moving for purposes of “family 
unification”, do not find their identity or purpose in the process of moving itself (in fact, for many of 
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global/transnational kind. But the logic of migration is rarely, if ever, the flux of 
movement, but the attainment of a new fixity, a new spatially bounded rootedness. As 
a rule, migrants do not havemoving between points as their purpose, but solely as a 
means to an end. Migrants do not find their identity in motion, in other words. They 
are not committed to an identity of “fluid homes”--mostly quite the reverse, in fact. 
This is true whether or not particular migrancies are more or less voluntary or more or 
less enforced. Globalization, in some format, may be the underlying reason and 
certainly the contextual framework for increased mobility and displacement of ever 
more people of the “migrant” kind, but globalization should not be mistaken for an 
identity-defining, de-territorializing rationale of migrants, neither individually nor 
collectively. In fact, the more massive the migration, the more emphatically migrants 
tend to search for new stable homes elsewhere. This is not to deny that migration 
comes with a vengeance in terms of identity, belonging and homeness, since old 
identities and memories of the places they came from, or have been told about, or are 
constantly reminded of by people and institutions in their new homes, stick in their 
minds and keep (co)defining their sense of belonging (cf the exposé in section 2)--
hence sentiments of exile, diaspora and multiple belongingness, and hence 
transnational forms of migrant organizations. But all of this must be conceptualized as 
consequences “after the fact”, and not as a jubilant embrace of a postnational 
condition. In this sense, migrants are victims of global processes, not their architects. 
Second distinction: between migrants and movers. Where migrants move in order to 
resettle, movers move either for the temporary pleasure of movement (travellers, 
tourists) or because they are the architects of global processes and invest their money, 
careers and lifestyles in and on the global arena (cosmopolitan nomads of varying 
hue). This, as argued above, does not nullify the national point of departure of these 
privileged elites and “symbolic analysts”, although, unlike migrants, they do their 
utmost to delete any suspicion of national sentiments from their mental harddisk and 
behavioural currency. As a rule, they embrace and celebrate, if not transnationalism 
tout court, at least internationalism in the most liberal forms imaginable. Where the 
movement of migrants is finite, involving the abandonment of homes, networks and 
possessions, in favour of hoped-for replacements elsewhere in the world, the 
movement of cosmopolitan nomads is in principle infinite and continuous, 
incrementally adding homes, networks and possessions to the list, and for many 
constituting distinct lifestyles in their own right. Here, therefore, it makes sense to 
assume that movement is not just instrumental, a means to an end, but part of the 
overall teleology and identity of these movers--and shakers. 
It makes sense, of course, that the architects of global processes should invest part 
of their identity make-up in the time/space compression that globalization carries in its 
wake. But this should not be allowed to confuse the overall picture: the general 
“publics” in this world, and the ever increasing masses of economic or political 
migrants, more often than not are on the fringes of these processes, and either do not 
move except for touristic purposes, or move only reluctantly and against their better 
judgement/desires. And international migration apart (often between third-world and 
first-world countries), labour mobility as a rule takes place within national boundaries 
                                                                                                                                             
these people, questions of identity and postmodernity are a luxury that they are hardly concerned 
with). 
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(see eg. the EU), where the national hub of belonging and homeness can be preserved 
intact. Ironically, the term “mobile homes”, as we know, refers neither to that type of 
movement not to the extravaganzas of cosmopolitan nomads, but is an often 
condescendingly applied term used to describe the life of marginalized sections of 
society who do not possess the wherewithal to rent or buy a “proper” home and who 
are therefore compelled to a life of constant movement between trailer parks that all 
look much the same. Movement and diversity do not necessarily go together, and de-
territorialization is far from always a bliss--let alone an ideal that people practically 
and voluntarily pursue. Except in one form, paradoxically, i.e. that of “national 
identity”, which contrary to ordinary discourse possesses some of the characteristics of 
a de-territorialized identity form--though one that is not predicated on physical 
movement. (This point will be developed further below--under “house and home”). 
Third distinction: between “multicultural settings” and identity fixation. It is no 
doubt true that migration can result in the production or strengthening of multicultural 
communities, and also that processes of transvaluation in such communities can 
impact members’ cultural horizons and individual profiles in the direction of 
“hybridization”--though this is a possibility rather than a necessity. However, in a 
sense (see section 3 above) all communities, including national ones, are 
“multicultural”, and what migratory processes do is primarily to foreground 
multiculturality as the official codeword (and sometimes ideal) for the political and 
sociological handling of problems attendant on immigration within specific national 
settings. In this sense, most talk of multiculturalism is not just politicized from the 
outset, but furthermore presupposes the nation-state and its national identity as the 
taken-for-granted framework and objective. In other words, forms of multiculturalism 
that are compatible with the nation-state, which further integration, and are useful as 
underpinnings of national loyalty, are acceptable and frequently advocated; forms that 
don’t spell problems and are discouraged/opposed.  
But this is also to say (assuming such a presumption is correct and realistic) that 
multiculturalism/hybridity are not per se antagonistic to the construction of fixed 
(national) identities--that there is neither a logical nor practical opposition between the 
two. It follows from the fact that cultures are not causally, deterministically related to 
identities in a one-to-one correlation (see section 3). Further, “hybridity” is a very 
different thing from the outside and the inside perspective: for the observer it seems 
like a motley composite in constant motion, but from the subjective “owner” 
viewpoint more probably like a relatively stable and fixed make-up (though the result 
of a number of identity choices and intersubjective negotiations), appearing finally as 
“character” or “personality”. Here it is imperative to rigidly distinguish between the 
characteristics of a milieu in its totality and individual cultural and identity-related 
formations. Whereas the former might have the characteristics of a heterogeneous and 
arbitrarily concatenated mass of disparate elements, the latter normally do not--and 
when they do nevertheless, are signs of socio-psychological conflicts. 
Multiculturalism is only a real problem for national states when it has not been 
properly de-politicized on the level of public discourse and in the minds of citizens. In 
other words, cultural diversity must not by its constituent parts be interpreted as 
involving loyalty to other sovereigns (hence, demands for dual citizenship are rarely 
welcomed by national governments, though sometimes tolerated)--rather, the 
Discourses and Images of Belonging: Migrants between “New Racism”, Liberal Nationalism 
and Globalization 
19
“multicultural” individual should symbolically attest to his/her allegiance and genuine 
wish to belong to the “host” country. This does not guarantee full recognition, but is its 
necessary prerequisite.  
However, although in principle “hybridization” and a fully fixed, stable, “native” 
sense of identification with the host country is not an unattainable ideal, and 
sometimes materializes too, contemporary “migrant settlers” (whether first or second 
generation) tend to practice this model of convergence in ways that are slightly 
different from a “host-society” blueprint, but at the same time one that is far removed 
from the “identities-in-flux” hypotheses of globalists and also from the “divided 
loyalty”, moral panic hysteria of receiving societies. 
Modern migrants, as a rule (and of course there are exceptions), want to shape their 
own identities in such a way that they integrate sociologically and politically into the 
host societies and assume a “host-society” identity on their own cultural premisses. 
For instance, they fail to see how the wearing of veils and the practice of Islam in 
general contravenes their adoption of a Danish identity, why the maintenance of 
networks organizing their “ethnic claims” and cultural adherence to their “countries of 
origin” is not compatible with belonging to Denmark, and why dual citizenship is 
anything more than a practical measure to facilitate their movement (as travellers, not 
migrants) between their old and new homes. The point here is not to assess whether 
such assumptions and expectations are realistic or contradictory, but to record that 
from these contemporary migrants’ perspective (who have mostly abandoned the myth 
of return that was so prevalent 20 or 30 years ago), their many-sided sense of 
belonging does not run counter to their desire for integration and recognition as 
nationals in their new countries. What this amounts to in actual practice is an argument 
that new configurations between x-(national) identity and its cultural underpinnings 
are possible and desirable, and need not become politicized. Host societies, on the 
other hand, have a tendency to interpret precisely such new configurations as a 
potential threat to long-established traditions, ways of life and political cultures, and 
routinely react by transforming even the most innocuous identity-reshaping exercises 
into political problems--although the concrete form that such transformations take 
depends on the precise characteristics of the nation-state in question. 
Fourth distinction: between house and home. Questions of belonging--generally as 
well as in terms of migrancy--would be easy to settle if there existed an unproblematic 
relationship between “house” and “home”--if “home” for people’s imaginative lives 
was always and unquestionably where one’s house is located and where one for that 
reason has settled down or at least lives (permanently or temporarily). The two terms, 
admittedly, are often used interchangeably, but the connection between their meanings 
is at best metonymic. “House” is part of, sometimes the central part of images of 
homeness and belonging (cf the English adage “my house is my castle”), but the 
cultural and political imaginary of “home” covers a lot more--spatially and temporally-
-than the physical location of residence. 
I return here to my point above relating to the de-territorial aspect of national 
identity. National belonging interpreted as “home” is clearly distinct from “house” or 
even “locality”--it is abstract in Anderson’s sense of “imagined communities”, since a 
lot of the national territory, population and history exists only as imagined, as spatially 
extended and temporally reinterpreted perceptions which far transcend the bounds of 
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individually familiar or practically useful homeness in the sense of “house” and its 
immediate surroundings. National identity is thus de-territorialized not in the sense 
that nation-states do not have clear-cut spatial boundaries, but that these are not 
individually and naturally meaningful identity criteria, but--like “collective national 
memory”--politically, culturally and historically orchestrated spaces, landscapes and 
locales, abstractions from the immediate life-world of individuals that are presented 
and often accepted as the limits of “homeness”, because they converge with the limits 
of political sovereignty. However natural and organic this organization of the nation-
as-home may seem, in fact it is not just a historical construction, but one in which 
territory is chiefly meaningful as a symbolic rather than physical entity. Thus, “home” 
even for the traditional national citizen is a dual concept: on the one hand it exists 
physically, as “house” and “locality”, on the other as “nation”, in the de-territorialized 
sense set out above. The best example of this are the images of belonging of people 
who distinguish between their present physical but inauthentic “home” and their “real” 
national home, from which they are exiled, where they might never have been, whose 
language they speak badly or not at all, and which lives only in their fantasies, e.g. 
Volksdeutsche (Wolff, 2000), or second- and third-generation immigrants who 
symbolically (and sometimes materially too) reconstruct their originary home where 
their house is, thus creating their very own virtual convergence in a process of 
mimicking the nation-state blueprint (e.g. overseas Chinese communities in Europe). 
This underlying national (European) ideal is that house, home, belonging and 
identity should be totally co-terminous. It has already been argued how globalization 
tends toward separating these elements and questioning the absoluteness of national 
boundaries. Migration patterns, in one sense, contribute to the same process. What 
contemporary migrants do when they attempt to reorganize identities and forms of 
belonging is little more than taking advantage of the opportunity presented by such 
globalizing forces, but, it should be emphasized, also by the constructedness, 
contingency and variability of national identity. The hyphenated model of American 
identity organizes and recognizes this model, based on the assumption that the core of 
identity is undivided loyalty to American constitutional values, but that this can be 
orchestrated, individually or collectively, in a variety of ways, and that attendant forms 
of cultural belonging and homeness can be multiple as well. In Europe, on the other 
hand, states prefer to monitor not just the resultant identity in terms of its practicality 
and consequences, but, in spite of historical contingencies, also the preferred national 
configurations between identity, belonging and cultural resources (for that reason, in 
immigration matters they have great difficulties respecting their own constitutional 
principles, such as separation of Church and State and the concomitant 
freedom/privacy of religious belief). Homogeneity, both in spite of its 
abstractness/malleability and in spite of occasional rhetorical dedication to European 
diversity, is not up for grabs, citizenship comes with a price-tag, and identity in 
European states cannot be left to mostly unwelcome intruders to construct at their own 
convenience. 
6. Concluding Observations 
The Introduction (section 1) discussed the issue of the ubiquitousness and legitimacy 
of “belonging” and the way in which the notion has increasingly come to occupy 
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center stage in contemporary identity politics--a fact reflected inter alia in the rapidly 
growing academic literature on the subject. In terms of pure analytical description, it is 
apparent that the popularity of the notion is intimately tied up with the “postmodern” 
fluidities of borders and related phenomena of migration, globalization and 
interdependence; with the fact that the term has increasingly been adopted by 
ethnic/minority groups intent on confirming their (dual/multiple) feelings of belonging 
to a new polity and making “ethnic claims” on that background; and with the political 
discourses of “host societies” (having thus been legitimated “from below”) now 
finding the confidence to ideologically and rhetorically “repossess” their very own 
cultural and territorial framework of belonging and consequently to specify to 
newcomers which conditions they must meet in order to be accepted as (also) 
belonging.  
These sub-themes indicate that the issue of belonging in its present-day 
configurations is both an articulation of “globalization” and a reactive, “nationalizing” 
response to it. If we add to this diagnosis the fact that issues and legitimacies of 
politics of belonging have become prominent since 1990--the victory of the west 
euphemistically referred to as the end of the Cold War--a few additional comments are 
called for. Globalization is a set of processes, transnational by nature, driven by 
economic interests, and primarily fathered by the USA, which basically regards the 
existence of national borders and national sovereignty as an obstacle and strives 
toward minimizing their role(with the exception of specific types of population 
movement). As a uniform and agenda-setting set of forces and discourses, it was, in a 
manner of speaking, “set free” by the victory of the west in the Cold War, since the 
global polarity and its ideological outgrowths until 1990 had set certain limits to how 
far, how fast and how freely western market-forces, western media and western 
democratic values could impact the global stage. On the other hand, where the Cold 
War “froze” globalization, it simultaneously constrained manifestations of 
nationalism, and when it ended set free this ideological force as well. 
In cultural terms, globalization is logically a “leveller” and homogenizer, though in 
the real-life world of transnational processes it comes up against a variety of 
counteracting influences and paradoxical consequences--partly because political and 
entrepreneurial “globalizers” are also, like ordinary citizens, “rooted” in nation-state 
contexts and represent more or less obvious national interests and “identities”; partly 
because globalization in its immediate economic and social effects poses threats to 
handed-down ways and standards of life, material and psychological security etc. 
(though the threat varies from one global region and nation-state to the next and 
obviously between different social classes too); and partly because the drive toward 
the establishment of new nation-states and new nationalisms is part and parcel of the 
very same process (see above).  
The combination of the threat that globalization undoubtedly constitutes to 
established lifestyles and the fact that these lifestyles routinely become associated with 
the traditional political context and its traditional form of power execution, i.e. the 
nation-state, accounts in general terms for the contemporary romantic return to the 
nation-as-home. However, it also provides a pointer to the universally 
negative/sceptical attitude among “ethno”-national citizenries toward the rise in 
immigration into their countries. For migration (including rising numbers of refugees, 
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displaced persons, and other victims of ethno-national conflicts)--one of the many 
attendant phenomena of globalization--becomes symbolically singled out as the most 
prominent (humanly visible) threat factor and indeed as a cause rather than a 
consequence of all the (real or imagined) ills that globalization (and/or in some 
countries: Europeanization) implies for what is interpreted as citizens’ “national 
identity” and their rightful “scene of belonging”. Thus, immigrants, like often before 
in world history, in a process of “mass semiosis” are penalized and stigmatized, or just 
barely accepted, for processes they have not created. Advocating multiculturalism in 
their new national homes naturally only makes things worse in the eyes of self-styled 
homogeneous societies; and political backing, from right to center of the political 
spectrum, clinches it and triggers a reversal of tolerance and liberalism back to overt 
racism and policies of exclusion. “Belonging” has been vindicated, having negotiated 
the path from conceptual outcast to guest of honour. 
The irony and paradox is that the “multicultural” discourses of immigrant, “ethnic” 
minorities and their supporters and champions around the world in the global era are 
doing little else, willy-nilly, than using as their role-model the discourses of ethnicity, 
minority positioning and related claims-making so prevalent on the domestic scene of 
the great globalizer, the “melting-pot” of the USA. It is paradoxical because this type 
of “multiculturalism” works extremely well in the States and is an integral part of the 
“identity kit” of most Americans. And it is ironic because once this “model” of 
identity/interest configuration is exported to other parts of the world (often by people 
critical of “US culture”), it immediately becomes politicized in a way which US 
citizens and the US polity would never have imagined in their wildest dreams. As 
argued in section 3, the secret of American multiculturalism is that it plays itself out 
under an umbrella of confident and very homogeneous allegiance to shared values, 
shared goals and shared historical legends--in other words, a collective perception of 
“manifest destiny” which does not contradict but forms the very underpinning of 
American individualism and its optimal pursuit of “happiness”. “Belonging” in the 
USA implies wholesale acceptance of this very particular version of democratic 
nationalism--and proof of belonging resides less in passive oaths of allegiance than in 
the practical success citizens or groups of citizens can demonstrate in their business-
related or political practice. Multiculturalism, diversity and ethnic claims-making 
“make sense” within this context, both as a means of constructing and projecting 
particularistic, socially competing cultural profiles, and as a platform for the 
expression of grievances and the vindication of group interests. In the latter sense they 
are, of course, “political”, but with the important proviso that the American “model” 
does not perceive specific “ethnic” claims (with the exception of militant Black 
organizations) or their reference to cultural diversity as a threat to the political identity 
of the USA. Hence they never, like for instance in Europe, give rise to high political 
rhetoric where the future and very soul of the country is apocapyptically orchestrated 
as threatened by for instance the influx of “illegal” Mexican agricultural labourers 
across the border. 
This is not the place to enter into the many historical and cultural reasons for these 
differences and their links with the specifics of the US nation-state in comparison with 
European, Asian and South American societies and polities. The point is merely to 
take note of the remarkable variation in the shape, dynamics and “interpretation” of 
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multiculturalism and belonging, when on the one hand what appears to be near-
identical models and discourses become reconfigured in their encounter with different 
national contexts and when, on the other, both practical and theoretical advocates of 
multicultural belonging, who take their explicit cue from US multiculturalism, 
underestimate both the degree of homogeneity in the States and the will and dedication 
of their own elites and compatriots to doggedly oppose this particular cultural export 
article of American-led globalization and rather stick with the homegrown variant of 
culture and belonging. 
References 
Beissinger, Mark R., 1995. “The Persisting Ambiguity of Empire”, Post-Soviet Affairs, 11,2, pp. 149-
84. 
Bell, Vikki, ed., 1999, Performativity and Belonging. London: Sage. 
Benhabib, Seyla, forthcoming. “Citizens, Residents and Aliens in a Changing World: Political 
Membership in a Global Era”, in Hedetoft, Ulf and Hjort, Mette, eds, Reimagining Belonging: Self 
and Community in an Era of Nationalism and Postnationality. Minnesota: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Billig, Michael, 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage. 
Bromley, Roger, 2000. Narratives for a New Belonging. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Brubaker, Rogers, 1996. Nationalism Reframed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Carter, Erica, Donald, James, and Squires, Judith, eds, 1993. Space and Place: Theories of Identity 
and Location. London: Lawrence Wishart. 
Czaplicka, John, and Ruble, Blair, eds, forthcoming. Composing Urban History and the Constitution 
of Civic Identities. Publisher as yet unknown. 
Durkheim, Emile, 1965. The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. New York: Free Press. 
Giddens, Anthony, 1999. The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gubert, Renzo, ed., 1999. Territorial Belonging Between Ecology and Culture. Trento: University of 
Trento (Sociology Series). 
Hall, John A. and Lindholm, Charles, 1999. Is America Breaking Apart? Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Hedetoft, Ulf, 1995. Signs of Nations. Aldershot: Dartmouth. 
Hedetoft, Ulf, 1999. “The Nation-state Meets the World”, European Journal of Social Theory 2 (1), 
pp. 71-94. 
Hedetoft, Ulf and Hjort, Mette, eds, forthcoming. The Postnational Self: Belonging and Identity 
Belonging. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 1967/1774. Auch eine Philosophie der Geschichte zur Bildung der 
Menschheit, in Sämtliche Werke, Band V. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung. 
Hudson, Robert and Réno, Fred, eds, 2000. Politics of Identity: Migrants and Minorities in 
Multicultural States. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Ignatieff, Michael, 1993. Blood & Belonging. London: Chatto and Windus. 
Ignatieff, Michael, 1999. “The Grandeur and Misery of Cosmopolitanism”, paper presented to 
conference on “Reimagining Belonging”, Aalborg University, May 6-8, 1999. 
Keitner, Chimène I., 1999. “The False Promise’ of Civic Nationalism”, Millennium, vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 
341-351. 
Kymlicka, Will, 2001. Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Citizenship. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lichtenberg, Judith, 1999. “How Liberal Can Nationalism Be?”, in Beiner, Ronald, ed., Theorizing 
Nationalism, New York: State University of New York Press. 
Motyl, Alexander J., 1999. Revolutions, Nations, Empires:Conceptual Limits and Theoretical 
Possibilities. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Rapport, Nigel & Dawson, Andrew, eds, 1998. Migrants of Identity. Perceptions of “Home” in a 
World of Movement. Oxford: Berg. 
AMID Working Paper Series 24
Renan, Joseph Ernest, 1882. “Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?” [lecture at the Sorbonne], in Discours et 
Conférences, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1887. 
Schlesinger, Arthur, 1992. The Disuniting of America. Knoxville, Tenn.: Whittle Direct Books. 
Skribis, Zlatko, 2000. Long-Distance Nationalism: Diasporas, Homelands and Identities. Aldershot: 
Ashgate. 
Tönnies, Ferdinand, 1957 [1887]. Community and Society [Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft]. East 
Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press (translated by Charles P. Loomis). 
Weiler, Joseph, 1997. “Belonging in Europe--Eros and Civilization”, paper presented to Nobel 
Symposium on Nationalism and Internationalism in the Post-Cold War Order, Stockholm, 
Sweden, 7-10 September. 
Wolff, Stefan, 2000. “German Expellees and Their Organisations between Heimat and Zuhause. A 
Case Study of the Politics of Belonging”. Paper delivered at the conference “Diversity within 
Unity”, Lady Margaret Hall, Oxford, 2-6 August 2000 (mimeo). 
Yack, Bernard, 1999. “The Myth of the Civic Nation”, in Beiner, Ronald, ed., Theorizing Nationalism, 
New York: State University of New York Press. 
AMID Working Paper Series 
 
Copies of the Working Papers are available for DKK 25.00 each. The Working Papers 
are also available on AMID’s website: http://www.amid.dk. 
 
1. Morten Ejrnæs (2001). Integrationsloven – en case, der illustrerer etniske 
minoriteters usikre medborgerstatus. 
2. Tomas Hammar (2001). The Ugly Duckling and the Academy. 
3. Jeffrey H. Cohen (2002). Social Responses to Migration among Rural Oaxacans: 
Outcomes in Sending and Receiving Communities. 
4. Bülent Diken (2002). Justification and Immigration in the Network Society – A 
New Ambivalence? 
